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Abstract 
Currently, in the competitive Islamic financial system, mudarabah (profit sharing) is seen as an alternative mechanism in 
financing techniques that differentiate it from the conventional financing that consist interest mechanism. Since its introduction, 
mudarabah (profit sharing) has gone through various evolution to fulfill the needs of the fast-developing Islamic financial 
market. However, in the current Islamic financial system, mudarabah (profit sharing) has become less preferable compared to 
Islamic debt financing instruments such as murabahah and bai’ bithaman ajil. This is caused by the existence of asymmetric 
information that continuously presents in mudarabah (profit sharing) contracts and creates problems of adverse selection and 
moral hazard. Due to this, mudarabah (profit sharing) has declined it importance as a financing vehicle. Therefore, the objectives 
of this study are twofolds, first, to examine the thought and evolution of mudarabah (profit sharing) from the viewpoints of 
classical and contemporary Islamic scholars and second, to evaluate the asymmetric information that continuously exist in this 
type of contract. 
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Equity financing instruments for Islamic business contracts are based on the mudarabah (profit sharing) and 
musharakah (profit loss sharing) principles. These financing methods are an alternative to conventional debt 
financing that is based on rate of interest (riba). Equity financing involves mutual sharing of risks and profits, 
depending on the performance of the investment project. In the case of mudarabah (profit sharing), the contracting 
parties i.e. the fund provider (rabbulmal)-who supplies the financial capital and the entrepreneur (mudarib)-who 
supplies the expertise and management, will collectively take part in profit sharing venture. Profits derived from the 
project will be shared according to the predetermined profit-sharing ratio such as 60:40 or 70:30 by both parties. In 
the event of failure, all losses must be borne by the fund provider (rabbulmal), while the entrepreneur (mudarib) 
would have lost his time and effort. 
However, from the practical side, mudarabah (profit sharing) contract is less preferred compare to debt 
financing instruments because of the asymmetric information problems that continuously exist in this mode of 
financing. The asymmetric information on mudarabah (profit sharing) contract, especially on the asset side, 
normally occurred as an entrepreneur (mudarib) who manage the mudarabah (profit sharing) fund have full control 
of the project and have more information regarding the project and its profitability which the Islamic bank (rabbul 
mall) does not usually have access to. The inefficiency in information delegation will generate two major problems, 
i.e. adverse selection and moral hazard that makes it difficult for the contracting parties to achieve an optimal 
contract. Due to this, there is a lack of interest among Islamic financial institutions to use mudarabah (profit sharing) 
as a financing vehicle. According to Bacha (1997), mudarabah (profit sharing) has lower expected returns and 
higher risks; this inequality in the distribution of risk and return has caused full-fledged and window Islamic banks 
to reduce the utilization of mudarabah (profit sharing) financing in their investment. 
Therefore, the objectives of this study are twofolds: first, to examine the thought and evolution of mudarabah 
(profit sharing) contract from the viewpoints of classical and contemporary Islamic scholars, and second, to evaluate 
the inherent problems i.e. assymetric information that prevail in this type of contract. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the mudarabah (profit sharing) from 
the classical islamic scholars viewpoint. Section 3 discusses the evolution of mudarabah contract from 
contemporary islamic scholar viewpoints. Section 4 highlights the asymmetric information problem in mudarabah 
(profit sharing) contract. Finally, section 5 concluded the study. 
 
2.  Mudarabah (profit sharing) From The Classical Islamic Scholars Viewpoint 
 
Mudarabah (profit sharing) is one of the earliest business forms used by the pre-Arabs for trade activities. 
Different terms are used to mean mudarabah (profit sharing): muqaradah is commonly used by the Hanafi and 
Hambali scholars and qirad is used by the Maliki and Shafie scholars. 
Even though mudarabah (profit sharing) has no basis in the Quran or the Sunnah, it was employed by the early 
Muslims to conduct trade. The term “mudarabah (profit sharing)” is derived from al-darb al-ard which means 
“traveling through the land” as mentioned in the following verse of the al-Quran: 
 
“….others traveling the land seeking of Allah’s bounty” (Al-Muzzammil: 20). 
 
It was also approved by Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W) as reported by Suhayb r.a.: 
“Three matters that have the blessing (of Allah (S.W.T)) i.e. a deferred sale, muqaradah (mudarabah (profit 
sharing)), mixing the wheat and barley for domestic use and not for sale”                                       (Sunan Ibn Majan) 
 
Mudarabah (profit sharing) is also known as “silent partnership” (Al-Zuhayli, 2007) whereby it involves a 
financier (rabbulmal), who provides a specific amount of capital and acts as a sleeping or dormant partner and an 
entrepreneur (mudarib), who acts as a trustee or a business agent. The mudarib is required to utilize and manage the 
capital in prudence and good manner to generate optimal profits for the mudarabah (profit sharing) investment, 
while adhering to the laws of Shariah. The mudarib does not invest any property in the business venture except for 
his knowledge and skills. He is also not entitled to claim any wage for conducting the business venture. Mudarabah 
(profit sharing) is one of the oldest business forms used by the pre-Arabs for trade activities. Literally, the word 
mudarabah (profit sharing) is derived from the  phrase “al-darbfi  al-ard” which means to make a journey (ISRA, 
2011). The literal meaning of this partnership is that, in the past this contract required the parties involved to make a 
journey to run their business. 
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Generally, mudarabah (profit sharing) is a partnership in profit whereby one party provides capital (rabbul 
maal) and the other party (mudarib) provides labour. The profit, if any, will be shared between them at a mutually 
agreed ratio, In case of a loss, it will be borne by the fund provider (rabbul maal) and the mudarib will lose his 
efforts. 
Different terms have been used for mudarabah (profit sharing) such as muqaradah that was commonly used by 
the Hanafi and Hambali scholars and qirad was used by the Maliki and Shafie scholars. Mudarabah (profit sharing) 
is also known as “silent partnership” (Al-Zuhayli, 2007) whereby it involves a financier/fund provider (rabbul 
maal), who provides a specific amount of capital and acts as a sleeping or dormant partner and an entrepreneur 
(mudarib), who acts as a trustee or a business agent. 
 
2.1 Legitimacy of Mudarabah (profit sharing) Contract 
 
The legitimacy of  mudarabah (profit sharing)  contract has been established  in the Quran, Hadis and the 
consensus of Muslim scholars (Ijma’). The pesimissibility of mudarabah (profit sharing) contract  has been  
mentioned in the following verse of the al-Quran: 
“….others traveling the land seeking of Allah’s bounty”                                            (Surah Al-Muzzammil: 20) 
 
There two hadiths which stated this partnership arrangement and approved by the Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W): 
 “Ibnu Abbas (may Allah be pleased with him) reported that: “When Abbas Ibn Abd al-Muttalib gave his property 
to someone for mudarabah (profit sharing), he stipulated conditions for his partner not to bring the capital onto the 
sea; and not to bring with him the capital crossing a valley; and not to buy livestock with the capital; and if his 
partner violates the conditions, he should guarantee the loss occurred. These conditions have been bought to the 
attention  of Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) and he approved them”.                
                                          (Narrated by Al-Bayhaqi in Al Sunan al-Kubra, as cited in Abdul Rahman, 2012) 
 
2.2 Pillars and Conditions of Mudarabah (profit sharing) 
 
2.2.1 Sighah (Ijab and Qabul) 
 
 Basically, the condition related to the sighah of mudarabah (profit sharing) is similar to those other contracts 
which constitute an offer and acceptance. Mudarabah (profit sharing) is concluded when the parties use words that 
clearly indicate the contract of mudarabah (profit sharing) in their offer and acceptance. 
 
 2.2.2 The Contracting Parties 
 
The contracting parties consist of fund provider (rabbul maal) and entrepreneur (mudarib) that have a sound 
mind and able to take responsibilities. Fund provider (rabbul maal) will provide capital to the entrepreneur 
(mudarib) for investing it in a business enterprise by applying his skills and efforts. 
 
2.2.3 Subject Matter and Conditions of Mudarabah (profit sharing)  
(i) Types of Capital 
 
There are various opinions on the types of capital for mudarabah (profit sharing) contract. Mudarabah (profit 
sharing) capital is the wealth entrusted to the mudarib for productive use and at the same time to promote mutual 
goodwill between the contracting parties. According to Ibn Rushd, one of Maliki scholar, the majority of the jurists 
agree that the investment capital should be in the form of monetary assets or currency (dinar or dirham) as it 
possesses intrinsic value as a medium of exchange and legal tender that is accepted by all parties involved in the 
contract (Borhan & Sa’ari, 2007).   
Meanwhile, most Islamic scholars rule out the use of non-monetary assets or in kind as capital, as it generates 
uncertainty (gharar) on the estimation of the initial value of the assets, which may be different according to the 
persons evaluating the said property. Furthermore, the fluctuation of prices of non-monetary investments may lead 
to inequitable advantages and disadvantages between the contracting parties. For example, if the prices of 
commodities increase when the contract is executed, the entrepreneur will benefit from the price rise as his share of 
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profits will increase upon termination of the contract. Meanwhile, if the price declines, the market value of the 
commodities drops and investors have to face losses and less profit distribution (Borhan and Sa’ari, 2007).  
However, two legal scholars, Ibn Abi Layla and Al-Awzai both dissents on the issue, permitting the use of non-
monetary assets as capital (Al-Zuhayli, 2007). 
On the other hand, Abu Hanifa, Malik and Ibn Hanbali permit listing the price of non-monetary assets as 
mudarabah (profit sharing) capital. The mudarib can sell the assets provided by the fund provider (rabbulmal) and 
use the price as capital for the contract. However, al-Shafie disagrees with this idea due to the inexistence of 
physical assets upon the contract (al-Zuhayli, 2007). 
Most Islamic scholars also agreed that the capital should not be in the form of debt owned by the potential 
entrepreneur from the fund provider (rabbulmal) (Al-Zuhayli, 2007). The rationale of this ruling is to prevent 
mudarabah (profit sharing) from becoming a mode for the rabbul maal to recover his debt and as a result gain 
benefit from the charge or interest. However, if the debt has been paid to the rabbul maal and then the money 
delivered again to the entrepreneur upon his need, the silent partnership remains valid. If the creditor instructs the 
debtor to use the money that he owes him as capital, the contract is rendered defective. Abu Hanifa, the Malikis, the 
Shafies and the Hanbalis agree that if the debtor continues to use the money he is owed, all profit and losses from 
the investment would be his and the debt remains intact (Al-Zuhayli, 2007).  
In order to collect debt from debtors, all scholars agree that the capital provider or creditor may hire an agent to 
do the task on his behalf and then use the money as capital in the silent partnership. In the case of deposit money, 
the Hanafis, Shafies and Hambalis, if someone is entrusted with a deposit and the depositors ask him to use the 
money as capital in silent partnership between them, the contract is valid. However, the Maliki scholars believe that 
pawned and deposited money is too similar to debts and thus do not qualify as capital. 
Meanwhile, in terms of capital protection, all classical scholars collectively agree on the prohibition of a 
guarantee scheme for mudarabah (profit sharing) because it is not relevant to mudarabah (profit sharing) ventures. 
Since mudarabah (profit sharing) operates under a profit-loss-sharing scheme and not a loan, therefore collateral and 
guarantees are not required. According to Rosly (2005) the idea of giving guarantees on mudarabah (profit sharing) 
contracts diverges from the basic philosophy of profit, loss sharing, i.e. al-ghorm bil ghonm (no reward without 
risk). 
 
(ii)  Distribution of Profits and Losses 
 
The entrepreneur (mudarib) is required to utilize and manage the capital in prudence and good manner to 
generate optimal profits for the mudarabah (profit sharing) investment, while adhering to the laws of Shariah. The 
entrepreneur (mudarib) does not invest any property in the business venture except for his knowledge and skills. He 
is also not entitled to claim any wage for conducting the business venture. 
The fund provider (rabbulmal) and entrepreneur (mudarib) are eligible to attain shares of profits in return for 
the investment capital of the former and the latter, for his effort to materialize the profit through business ventures. 
All Islamic scholars agree that the ratio in which the profits are to be distributed needs to be determined ex-ante to 
avoid any disagreement after the business has been conducted. The ownership of the capital or invested assets 
remain with the fund provider (rabbulmal) at all times. The fund provider (rabbulmal) is liable in the event of losses 
incurred by market risks, while the entrepreneur (mudarib) will lose his time and effort. The liability of the fund 
provider (rabbulmal) in mudarabah (profit sharing) is limited to the extent of his contribution to the capital and no 
more. However, if the loss is due to negligence or moral hazard (ghasib), the loss will be absorbed by the 
entrepreneur (mudarib).  
 
(iii) The Role of Contracting Parties in Mudarabah (profit sharing) Contract 
 
Mudarabah (profit sharing) contracts can be divided into two types, namely unrestricted (al-mudarabah al-
mutalaqah) and restricted (al-mudarabah al-muqayyadah). In the unrestricted case, the agreement does not specify 
the time period, the location of the business and the specific type of trade or service to be carried out. Meanwhile, 
under restricted mudarabah (profit sharing), the entrepreneur (mudarib) is confined to certain conditions set forth by 
the fund provider (rabbulmal). If the entrepreneur (mudarib) fails to comply with the restrictions of the fund 
provider (rabbulmal), he will be fully responsible for any resulting losses. 
353 Noraina Mazuin Sapuan /  Procedia Economics and Finance  35 ( 2016 )  349 – 358 
The Maliki and Shafie scholars approve that mudarabah (profit sharing) contract should be unrestricted as it 
encourages the entrepreneur to find more opportunities for better profit-earning. However, Abu Hanifa and Ahmad 
Ibn Hambali agree on restricting certain aspects of the mudarabah (profit sharing) contract, e.g. the time period and 
choice of the right agent in order to reduce business risks (Al-Zuhayli, 2007). 
 
(iv) The Dissolution and Termination of Mudarabah (profit sharing) Contract 
 
The mudarabah (profit sharing) contract is designed to fulfil the needs of the fund provider (rabbulmal) and the 
entrepreneur (mudarib) and to protect their interests. The contract is normally dissolved when both parties have 
agreed on the completion of the business venture with the settlement of profit distribution and closing of accounts. 
All the Islamic scholars agree that mudarabah (profit sharing) is non-binding before commencement of the 
work and may be dissolved by either party. According to al-Zuhayli (2007), the Hanafi, Hambali and Shafie scholars 
agree that either party can dissolve the contract at any time and that the contract is automatically terminated with the 
death of either party. But the Maliki scholars disagree with the other scholars and assert that once work begins, the 
contract becomes binding on both parties. In the case where one of the parties dies, the contract can be inherited by 
his heirs. According to non-Shafie scholars, the contract is also terminated if one of the parties becomes mentally 
unstable; however, the Hanafis rule that the mudarabah (profit sharing) contract will not be void if the rabbul maal 
is put under legal guardianship. 
In terms of capital requirement, the Hanafi scholars rule that the contract can be dissolved only if the 
partnership capital is in monetary form. But the Shafie and Hambali scholars agree that the dissolution of the 
partnership is valid even though the capital is non-monetary, as long as both parties agree to sell it and share the 
profit according to the pre-determined ratio. 
 
3.  Contemporary Islamic Scholar Viewpoints 
 
3.1 The Dynamic Evolution of Mudarabah (Profit Sharing) Contract 
 
The development of new products in the modern Islamic financial system is based on the rulings of 
contemporary scholars that the contract is valid as long as it does not contradict the provisions in the al-Quran and 
Sunnah. This belief is consistent with the opinion of Ibn Taymiyya (peace be upon him).  
“The underlying principle in contracts and stipulations is permissible (ibaha) and valid. Any (contracts and 
stipulations) is prohibited and void only if there is an explicit test (from al-Quran, the Sunnah and consensus) or a 
qiyas, proving its prohibition and voiding.”                                                                  
                                                            (Narrated by Ibn Taymiyya in al-Fatawa, as cited in Abdul Rahman, 2012) 
 
Generally, many contemporary Islamic economic scholars encourage the usage of profit loss sharing (PLS) i.e. 
mudarabah (profit sharing) and musyarakah (profit loss sharing) instruments due to its absence of riba and gharar 
for the development of current economic activities. However, in reality the PLS contract is less favoured by 
financial institutions because of various barriers such as legal requirements and moral hazard problems. 
 
3.1.2 Two-Tier Mudarabah  
 
Generally, the mudarabah (profit sharing) contract consists of one rabbul maal and one mudarib. However, 
according to Maliki scholars there is no restriction on the number of investors (rabbul maals) or entrepreneurs 
(mudaribs) in the same contract with the permission of the capital provider. 
According to the Hanafi scholar al-Sarakhsi, in the case of several entrepreneurs (mudaribs), the mudaribs can 
only act in accordance with mutual agreement and approval of the investor. If one of the entrepreneur (mudarib) act 
independently without his colleagues’ or investors’ permission, he becomes liable to the investor for any losses due 
to the independent and the unauthorised action (Borhan, 2004). 
However, the Shafie jurists have different views on multi-tier mudarabah (profit sharing). Most Shafie scholars 
prohibit the use of mudarabah (profit sharing) contract with several entrepreneur (mudarib) regardless of any 
permission given by the capital provider. Such contract is regarded as void if it is implemented. Yet, a few Shafie 
jurists such as al-Shirazi allow the implementation of this contract (Borhan and Sa’ari, 2007). 
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Many new contracts have emerged in the contemporary period. Basically, modern PLS instruments are formed  
based on studies by the classical Islamic scholars; however, new developments are introduced to fulfil the 
requirements and demands of modern industries. According to Al-Zuhayli (2007), among the contracts currently 
available that use the mudarabah (profit sharing) concept are; simple partnership (sharikat al-tawsiyah al-basitah), 
particular partnership (sharikat muhassah), joint stock companies (sharikat musahamah) and hybrid limited 
partnership (sharikat al-tawsiyah bi-l-ashum). 
 
 
Figure 1: Financing Process under Mudarabah (profit sharing) Contract 
 
Contemporary scholars agree that capital can be in the form of monetary or non-monetary assets. Nevertheless, 
debts or loans cannot be accepted as capital. Mudarabah (profit sharing) contracts can be either single-tier or multi-
tiered. In a single-tier contract, the fund provider (rabbulmal) deals directly with the entrepreneur (mudarib), 
meanwhile in two-tier contracts (Refer to Figure 1), fund provider (rabbulmal) entrust their funds to an agent, who 
acts as an intermediary and who later deals with the entrepreneurs chosen to execute the projects. The entrepreneur 
(mudarib) of a mudarabah (profit sharing) contract may assign the capital to another entrepreneur (mudarib) in 
another mudarabah (profit sharing) contract with the permission of the primary capital provider. The profit gain 
from the investment will be shared between the fund provider (rabbulmal) and the first entrepreneur (mudarib) 
based on the pre-determined ratio between them and the balance will then be shared with the other mudaribs. 
However, in the case of losses, it will be borne solely by the rabbul maal except if the loss was due to the 
negligence of the mudarib. The application of unrestrictive mudarabah (profit sharing) i.e. al-mudarabah al-
mutalaqah is considered the most suitable contract to be implemented in the modern investment structure whereby it 
would allow the entrepreneur (mudarib) more innovation and creativity in executing the business venture. 
 
3.1.2 Capital Guaranteed 
 
Contemporary scholars also approve on the idea of giving a third party guarantee (al-kafala) to the mudarabah 
(profit sharing) capital as it would be able to mitigate risk exposures and secure the return of the capital. The 
guarantee can protect investors (rabbul maal) from misconduct or fraud, but not from market risk. According to 
Dalla Albaraka, giving a guarantee to the entrepreneur (mudarib) in mudarabah (profit sharing) capital is prohibited. 
Yet, if the guarantee is given by the government, then it is allowed (Rosly, 2005).  Currently, third party guarantees 
can be obtained from the government or from private entities. 
In June 2002, the Shariah Advisory Committee of Bank Negara Malaysia ruled that third party guarantee is 
permissible for Islamic deposits. This guarantee scheme is based on the concept of mutual guarantee (al-kafala) 
among Islamic financial institutions as participants of the scheme. This scheme does not violate the Shariah 
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principles since its objective is to protect the public interest (maslahah), especially the depositors and the banking 
industry. However, Islamic banking institutions need to ensure that the funds gained from Islamic deposit insurance 
schemes are invested in Shariah-compliant instruments. In line with this, the government of Malaysia has introduced 
Perbadanan Insurans Deposit Malaysia (PIDM) or the Malaysia Deposit Insurance Corporation (MDIC), a fully 
guaranteed government agency as a third party to offer insurance coverage on deposits based on Shariah principles. 
Furthermore, in 2005, Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) approved Credit Guarantee Corporation Berhad (CGC) as 
a third party-guarantor for business ventures with the implementation of Islamic Direct Access Guarantee Scheme 
(DAGS-i). In this scheme, the guarantor will charge fees for the guarantee services given exclusively to Islamic 
financing products offered by Islamic financial institutions to their customers (BNM, 2008). 
 
3.1.3 Establishment of Profit Equalization Reserve 
 
In year 2004, the Malaysian Islamic banks have introduced a new mechanism in distributing profits for the 
mudarabah (profit sharing) investments. The new mechanism is known as Profit Equalisation Reserve (PER). The 
profit equalisation reserve is the amount appropriated by the Islamic bank (rabbul maal) out of the their gross profit 
such as from mudarabah (profit sharing) profit, before allocating it as an entrepreneur (mudarib) share, in order to 
maintain a certain level of return on investment for the Investment Account Holders (IAH) and to increase owners’ 
equity (ISRA, 2011).  
According to Shaharuddin (2010), in the real banking business, the monthly rate of return recorded by the 
Islamic bank (rabbul maal) throughout a year is inconsistent due to the flux of bad debt profit, provisioning and total 
deposit. Thus, in order to mitigate the fluctuation of the rate of return, the Central Bank of Malaysia has demanded 
all the Islamic bank (rabbul maal) in this country to implement the PER mechanism. 
This provision/reserve will be used whenever Islamic bank (rabbul maal) record a low profit. As such PER is 
viewed as a reserve that is built up in good times to cater for the need in a bad times (Ismail and Shahimi, 2006). 
This reserve is created with the purpose of covering the potential losses or as a face of fluctuations in return for the 
transaction conducted (Che Arshad and Ismail, 2011). It is also to ensure that Islamic banks have a fixed and 
competitive returns to the Investment Account Holders (IAH). Therefore, indirectly profit equalisation reserve 
similarly performs as a guaranteed (daman) on mudarabah (profit sharing) capital taken from the mudarib’s profit.  
Although the purpose of PER is undeniably important, its implementation, however causes more confusion. The 
Islamic banks may argue that they obtain the depositor’s permission based on the standard form signed at the 
beginning of the contract. But, the level of transparency pertaining to this matter is very low. The acceptance of the 
PER method in the Malaysian Islamic banking practices indicates the flexible approach adopted by their 
Supervisory Shariah Board members in modifying the Islamic commercial contracts (Shaharuddin, 2010).  
 
4.   Asymmetric Information Problem in Mudarabah (Profit Sharing) Contract  
 
Generally, Islamic financial institutions prefer to use debt financing instruments such as murabahah (short term 
debt) or bai’ bithaman ajil (long term debt) in their business activities as compared to equity financing tools. 
Adverse selection and moral hazard problems are the reasons why equity financing, especially mudarabah (profit 
sharing) is a less popular choice as a financing method in Islamic financial institutions.  
In reality, investments using mudarabah (profit sharing) are very risky as the entrepreneur (mudarib), often has 
more information about the proposed project and its profitability which the Islamic bank does not usually have 
access to. Hence, it leads to imperfect information between the contracting parties (Siddiqui, 2008). Meanwhile, 
Ismail and Tohirin (2008) and Khalil, Rickwood and Murinde (2002) discovered mudarabah venture can become 
unproductive when Islamic banks fail to embark effective screening process in the selection of suitable entrepreneur 
to manage a business venture before contracting and at the same time failed to monitor the entrepreneur’s actions 
after the contract is implemented. This generally related to the ability of entrepreneur to conceal information 
regarding his background and capabilities before contracting and his disguise actions after the contract is 
implemented. 
Sarker (2000) also revealed that the asymmetric information in mudarabah contract also cause by the untruthful 
behaviour of entrepreneur that failed to report the outcome accurately. Meanwhile, Iqbal and Lewis (2009) 
discovered that entrepreneurs with below average profit favour equity contract after debt contract in order to 
minimize losses in case of failure. In contrast, managers with above average earning prefer to use debt financing in 
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order to maximize their gains in case of success. This is in line with the finding from Allen and Gale (1992) where 
better quality firms use debt financing as a signal of their superior quality. The problem becomes more serious as the 
existence of restriction of using collateral for these assets by the regulator. Investment using mudarabah contract is 
also very risky as there is no certainty on returns. 
Adverse selection is the true risk of the entrepreneur (mudarib) before the investment is executed. Meanwhile, 
the problem of moral hazard arises when the mudarib is not motivated to fulfil the interests of the project other than 
for his benefit. It is also related to the risk that the entrepreneur would conceal information concerning his abilities 
and background before the contract and that he would perform independently after the contract is executed (Ismail 
and Tohirin, 2008). Furthermore, according to Dar and Presley (2000), such problems can also exist when the 
entrepreneur dishonestly under-reports or reduces the declared profits. 
 
4.1 Remedial Action to Reduce Asymmetric Information in Mudarabah (Profit Sharing) Contract  
 
Since the Islamic financial system runs on the principle of risk-sharing, disclosure of information between 
parties is very critical. Information regarding the possible combination on how the capital is used, the objective of 
the rabbulmal and performance of the venture, among others, must be transparent. According to Siddiqui (2008), 
risk and equity sharing contracts are related to various investment risks such as credit, market and operating risks 
which are the results of information imbalance, leading to a problem of adverse selection and moral hazard. Ismail 
and Tohirin (2008) reveal that the reason behind unsuccessful mudarabah (profit sharing) business ventures in 
Islamic banking is lack of expertise in monitoring the entrepreneur’s operations. Investments using mudarabah 
(profit sharing) contract are also very risky as there is no certainty on returns.  
 
4.1.1 Incentive Compatible Contract 
 
Presley and Sessions (1994) and Ahmed (2002) recommended the implementation of incentive-compatible 
contracts to allow more efficient disclosure of information between the contracting parties. The agency theory states 
that the agent may not always act in the best interests of the financier. Therefore, the investor needs to set 
appropriate incentives for the agent to earn higher return for the project. 
 
4.1.2 Screening and Monitoring Process 
 
Abalkhail and Presley (2002) emphasized on the use of screening process to overcome the problem of 
incomplete contract that create an adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Sarker (2000) and Ismail and 
Ahmad (2006) suggested the usage of screening as well as monitoring process to supervise the actions of the 
entrepreneur in the financing and investment activities. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), monitoring 
expenditure is an agency cost that is directly related to the financier’s monitoring of the agent’s behavior. Effective 
monitoring will reduces the agency costs even if the agent’s information and actions cannot be fully monitored. 
Various benefits can be shared by both principal (capital provider) and agent (entrepreneur) when the agency costs 
been minimize. Ahmed (2002) stated that asymmetric information can be resolved if the rabbul maal can gather 
more information on the operations of the firm especially through the monitoring process. Rabbul maal should 
evaluate and monitor the mudarib’s visions, objectives, market strategy, financial strategy and production process 
when the contract being executed. Recent studies by Muda and Ismail (2010) and Wan Kamaruddin and Ismail 
(2013) had proved that Mudharabah contract can achieve optimality and mitigate asymmetric problem as well as 
minimise transaction cost. 
 
 
4.1.3 Muslims’ Behavior 
 
From the Islamic perspective, risk and uncertainty can be mitigated through good behavior, as recommended by 
Islamic teachings. The al-Quran instructs trustworthiness (amanah) (Al.Baraqah, 282) and insists on fairness and 
justice in economic activities. Allah (S.W.T) commands such behaviour to generate harmony among mankind to 
achieve Maqasid as Shariah. As mentioned by Metwally (1997), the objective of an Islamic firm is not profit 
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maximization; nevertheless, Islamic firms aim to achieve reasonable (fair) profit since Islam instructs Muslims to be 
moderate in pursuit of profit and wealth. 
 
4.1.4 Corporate Governance in the Management of Contract 
 
Basically, corporate governance is related to the internal integrity of a corporation that promotes a corporate 
fairness, transparency and accountability in the management. Meanwhile, Islamic corporate governance is 
established from the epistemological aspect of Tawhid, embedded the Shari’ah rules and emphasize on the principle 
of consultation (shura) between every stakeholder that involved in the investment activities.   
 Currently, many Islamic scholars try to emphasize on the role of Islamic corporate governance to mitigate 
agency problems in Islamic financing instruments especially in mudarabah (profit sharing) contract. The special 
criterion that is highlighted in Islamic corporate governance is the role of sharia (the latter will be known as shuratic 
process in the decision making process.  
In the contemporary practice, shura have been suggested as one of the monitoring mechanism to attain 
accountability, fairness and transparency in the governance of Islamic corporations (Abdul Rahman, 1998; Iqbal and 
Mirakhor, 2004; and Hasan, 2009). 
 The member of shura will comprises of Islamic banks, shareholders, employees and the managers of firms. 
Through shura, every party involved will participate in the discussion and will open the door for information to be 
disclosed and delivered efficiently from the manager to the stakeholders, thus this will narrow down the asymmetric 
information in the venture. This is consistent with the spirit of Islam that emphasis on the importance of 
trustworthiness and cooperative among Muslim. At the same time, it is to ensure that every activity and decision on 
the business venture, especially that based on mudarabah (profit sharing) contract are mutually agreed by all parties 
involved before the realization of the contract as the capital provider cannot participate in the management activities.  
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
Mudarabah (profit sharing) has through various evolutionary changes and modernizations since its practice in 
the pre-Islamic era. The improvement on existing mudarabah (profit sharing) conditions in modern mudarabah 
(profit sharing) is acceptable provided that it does not contradict with the provisions in the al-Quran and Sunnah. 
The intention of this development is to fulfil the needs of the modern communities and the fast-growing Islamic 
financial market. However, in reality, mudarabah (profit sharing) is less preferable compared to Islamic debt 
financing instruments. This is due to the existence of imperfect information that is inherent in mudarabah (profit 
sharing) contracts and creates problem of adverse selection and moral hazard, also known as agency problems. As a 
result, mudarabah (profit sharing) has declined in importance as a financing vehicle. 
In order to overcome the agency problem, screening, monitoring and supervision of the mudarib (entrepreneur) 
by the capital provider have been suggested as the best tool to mitigate this problem. Meanwhile, from the Islamic 
perspective, the principle of amanah (trusteeship), fairness and shura (mutual consultation) have also been pointed 
out as part of reliable solutions to reduce the agency problem in mudarabah (profit sharing) contracts. As a faithful 
Muslim, the entrepreneur needs to work in a trustworthy manner and carry out his responsibility truthfully with the 
intention of obtaining Allah’s blessings and not for his self-interest. 
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